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FROM SWIFT to ERIE: AN HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE
Gene A Shreve*
HARMONY & DISSONANCE: THE SwIFT & ERIE CASES IN AMERI-
CAN FEDERALISM. By Tony Freyer. New York and London: New
York University Press. 1981. Pp. xv, 190. $22.50.
The content of Professor Freyer's book is both familiar and new.
The cases have been the subjects of extensive commentary. Sw#ft v.
Tyson' precipitated a massive amount of literature.2 Erie R. v.
Tompkins,3 the case that overruled Swift, was once "the 'Pole Star'
of contemporary legal scholarship" and remains a "star of the first
magnitude in the legal universe."4 Freyer supplements the literature
by concentrating in detail on the historical context surrounding the
two cases and related events during the nearly one hundred years
that separated them. He makes some interesting suggestions about
where these facts might lead, but the book is, overall, refreshingly
undoctrinaire. And, while Freyer is not the first to treat the subject
from an historical perspective,5 enough of his work is both new and
interesting 6 to justify the reader's time.
The Supreme Court held in Swf v. Tyson, a federal diversity
case, that it was not required by the Rules of Decision Act7 to follow
* Associate Professor of Law, New York Law School. LL.B. 1968, LL.M. 1975 Harvard
University. - Ed.
1. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
2. See, e.g., the authorities reviewed by Freyer at pp. 110-20.
3. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
4. Westen, After 'Zfefor Erie"-A Reply, 78 MICH. L. REV. 971, 971 (1980) (quoting B.
ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 272 n.4 (1977)).
5. See the discussion of M. HORWiTZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-
1860 (1977) and R. BRIDWELL & R. WHITrEN, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE COMMON LAW:
THE DECLINE OF THE DOCTRINES OF SEPARATION OF POWERS AND FEDERALISM (1977), at
notes 23-28 infra.
6. In chilling obiter dictum, Judge Kaufman once observed that a party before him was
"very much in the position of the proverbial disappointed author: much of what he wrote was
interesting, and much original; but what was interesting was not original, and what was origi-
nal was not interesting." Ionian Shipping v. British Law Ins. Co., 426 F.2d 186, 190 (2d Cir.
1970). Professor Freyer has clearly escaped this fate.
7. The statute was enacted as § 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789. At the time of Sw#2 it
provided:
That the laws of the several states, except where the constitution, treaties or statutes of the
United States shall otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in
trials at common law in the courts of the United States in cases where they apply.
I Stat. 92 (1789). In slightly amended form, the statute is now found at 28 U.S.C. § 1652
(1976).
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New York state judicial decisions concerning the law of negotiable
instruments. The common law of the New York state courts may
not have been clear on the point before the Court,8 but that was not
the reason for the decision. Writing for the Court, Justice Story
stated that, at least with regard to "contracts and other instruments
of a commercial nature," federal diversity courts were free to follow
their own best understanding of "the general principles and doc-
trines of commercial jurisprudence." 9 In such cases, Justice Story
said, state judicial decisions to the contrary were not part of the
"laws of the several states" as that term was used in the Rules of
Decision Act. Hence, the Act's mandate that state laws be followed
"as rules of decision" did not apply.10
Freyer's book is about the birth, growth, and demise of the Swift
doctrine. In it he examines successive attitudes about the proper re-
lationship between the Rules of Decision Act - perplexing in and of
itself" - and the law and policy of diversity jurisdiction.' 2 Justice
Brandeis would eventually ask in Erie whether a narrow reading
that excludes state judicial decisions from "laws of the several states"
in the Rules of Decision Act would not put federal judges in the
untoward, if not unconstitutional,1 3 position of displacing state sub-
stantive law with no greater claim to authority than that their diver-
8. Justice Story indicates that it was not, Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. at 17-18, and Freyer
agrees. P. 12. But see G. GILMOEo, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 32 (1977) (arguing that the
Court chose "to ignore an obvious solution to a simple case. .....
9. 41 U.S. at 19.
10. 41 U.S. at 18-19.
11. For an excellent survey of developments under the Rules of Decision Act from Sw/ft to
the present, see C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 347-87 (4th ed. 1983). "No issue
in the whole fieldi of federal'jurisprudence has been more difficult than determining the mean-
ing of this statute." -1d. at 347.
12. Rules of Decision Act problems are conceivable when federal courts are exercising
other types of subject matter jurisdiction, see Note, The Competence of Federal Courts to For-
mulate Rules of Decision, 77 HARv. L. REv. 1084, 1087 (1964), but it has always been in diver-
sity cases that hard questions concerning the applicability of state law arise, and the difficulty
of these questions is compounded by fundamental uncertainty concerning the purposes of di-
versity jurisdiction. See P. BATOR, P. MIsHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART AND
WECHSLER's THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 18-19 (2d ed. 1973); Kurland,
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, the Supreme Court and The Erie Doctrine in Diversity Cases, 67 YALE
LJ. 187, 195-96 (1957).
13. Writing of the Swift doctrine, Justice Brandeis stated:
If only a question of statutory construction were involved, we should not be prepared to
abandon a doctrine so widely applied throughout nearly a century. But the unconstitu-
tionality of the course pursued has now been made clear and compels us to do so.
304 U.S. at 77-78. In failing to make the shape of the constitutional question clear in Erie or
since, the Court created a congenial climate for spirited theorizing and debate. See, e.g., Ely,
The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARv. L. REv. 693 (1974); Friendly, In Praise of Erie -
and of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 383 (1964); Mishkin, Some Further
Last Words on Erie - The Thread, 87 HARv. L. REV. 1682 (1974); Note, The Competence of
Federal Courts to Formulate Rules of Decision, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1084 (1964); Note, The Law




sity jurisdiction had been invoked. However, as Freyer's book
makes clear, the issue was framed quite differently at the time of
Swift
Freyer's thesis is that "the central question in Swift v. Tyson in-
volved commercial law rather than federal-state relations" (p. 36).
He notes that the only disagreement among the justices in Swi is
evidenced in the concurring opinion of Justice Catron, who dis-
agreed with a point in Story's negotiable instrument analysis (p. 17).
Freyer points out that this degree of harmony cannot be explained
by the suggestion that members of the Supreme Court were unfamil-
iar with the issue of federal versus state power at the time of Swift.
On the contrary, he describes prior agitation over the propriety of
federal common law crimes, where assertions of "federal jurisdiction
threatened, Jeffersonians claimed, constitutional principles of limited
federal power."'14 By the time of Swft, Freyer notes, a majority of
the Court was Jacksonian, 15 sharing with earlier Jeffersonians a pref-
erence for decentralization of power (p. 2). Yet in Swi they agreed
with Story, a nationalist.' 6 This was possible, argues Freyer, because
concern over the uncertainty of commercial transactions united na-
tionalists and states' rights adherents alike. The author surveys the
legal, economic and political climate for commercial transactions at
the time of Swift. Commercial credit was becoming increasingly im-
portant to the economic vitality of all sections of the country. It fa-
cilitated the growth of farmer and shopkeeper classes in the West
and South and of the merchant class in the East (pp. 7-9). Yet com-
mercial law was plagued internally by doctrinal confusion (pp. 23-
25) and externally by hostility to the enforcement of debtor obliga-
tions exhibited by many state courts and state legislatures (pp. 20-
23). And, while not all Jacksonian Democrats shared Story's con-
cern over the unsettled state of the country's commercial environ-
ment, 17 Freyer is convincing when he suggests that Story'scolleagues
14. P. 12. "Agitation over the issue continued until 1816 when a divided Supreme Court
disavowed any authority to create a federal criminal law." P. 12 (citing United States v. Coo-
lidge, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 612 (1816)). A full citation to Coolidge is missing from the book,
apparently due to an editorial error in mismatching footnotes to text. See pp. 2, 165. Further
discussion of Coolidge and the events leading up to it can be found in Note, Swift v. Tyson
Exhumed, 79 YALE L.J. 284, 286-87 (1969). "IThe effect of Coolidge was to resolve the doctri-
nal confusion; few later opinions even felt it necessary to state that federal courts had no
jurisdiction over crimes at common law." Id at 287 (footnote omitted).
15. They included "such Democratic stalwarts as Chief Justice Roger B. Taney and Justice
Peter V. Daniel." Pp. 2-3.
16. From his youth in Marblehead, Massachusetts and early law practice in Salem, Story
developed "a decidedly federalist interest in commerce." Teton, The Story of Swf? v. Tyson,
35 ILL. L. Rv. 519, 522 (1941). As a congressman, Story acted in the interests of the business-
men and shipmasters in his district, winning "the inflexible contempt of Jefferson." Id Ear-
lier a supporter of a federal common law of crimes, id at 523, Story's nationalist sentiments
were abundantly clear by the time of Sw/if.
17. A "program of simplifying the law to bring judges under control, reduce the power of
lawyers, and increase the layman's ability to understand and deal with his own legal problems
February 1984]
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on the court, as well as many others favoring states' rights (pp. 18-19)
did.
In keeping with this view, Freyer suggests that Story drafted his
opinion so as best to cultivate the narrow strip of ground he held in
common with the Jacksonians.' 8 He did not directly pose the issue
of how far the rival law-making authority of the federal courts ex-
tended. Instead, he framed the holding by characterizing the com-
mercial law question as a matter of "general" law. From that
conclusion, he reasoned that the Rules of Decision Act did not re-
quire state decisions on point to be followed because application was
limited
to state laws strictly local, that is to say, to the positive statutes of the
state, and the construction thereof adopted by the local tribunals, and
to rights and titles to things having a permanent locality .... It never
has been supposed by us, that the section did apply, or was designed to
apply, to questions of a more general nature .... 19
Whatever the faults of the approach, bottoming the decision on a
characterization of the issue as one of general, rather than local, law
invoked "a distinction. . . which was familiar to antebellum law-
yers and judges" and one which "did not of itself challenge the
states' rights values of [Justices] Daniel, Taney, and others" (p. 36).
Freyer finds support for his thesis in the manner in which Swft v.
Tyson was received. He observes that the opinion was the subject of
favorable commentary concerning its commercial law analysis and
that no mention was made of Swft's interpretation of the Rules of
Decision Act (pp. 17-18). Grant Gilmore reached a similar conclu-
sion and offered a further perspective on Swit:
The point about Swf? v. Tyson is that it was immediately and enthusi-
astically accepted. No one suggested that it was an unconstitutional
usurpation of power by power-crazed judges or that it was a trick
played by a wily Federalist justice on his unsuspecting Jacksonian col-
leagues .... On the contrary, the doctrine of the general commercial
law was warmly welcomed and expansively construed, not only by the
lower federal courts but by the state courts as well. For the next half
century the Supreme Court of the United States became a great com-
mercial law court.20
Freyer's conception of Story's intent in Swf? stands up well, I
was loosely related to the Jacksonian ideology of the period." Note, supra note 14, at 300. This
is hardly compatible with the reverence displayed for "the general principles and doctrines of
commercial jurisprudence" in Swift. 41 U.S. at 19.
18. "Cotton planters such as [Justice] Daniel, as much as commercially oriented justices
like Story, understood the importance of uniform commercial rules to the smooth operation of
the antebellum credit system. Presented with a case that embodied no direct federal-state is-
sue, the justices were free to decide the commercial questions accordingly." P. 43 (footnote
omitted).
19. 41 U.S. at 18 (emphasis added).
20. G. GILMORE, supra note 8, at 33-34.
[Vol. 82:869
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think, against the theories of prior commentators. John Chipman
Gray's suggestion that Swift grew out of Story's "restless vanity" and
fondness for "glittering generalities" 2' is no longer taken very seri-
ously.22 The view of Story recently adopted by Morton Horwitz is
more interesting. Horwitz saw Swift as Story's "attempt to impose a
procommercial national legal order on unwilling state courts."'2 3 In
a spirited reply,24 Professors Bridwell and Whitten argue that Story's
opinion in Swift was intended only "to preserve the intentions and
expectations of the parties. . . against the assumed background of
general commercial practice. 25 The views of Horwitz and Freyer
on Swft are quite opposed, with Freyer having the best of the argu-
ment. In part, this is because Horwitz's view does not provide a sat-
isfactory means of explaining the acceptance of Story's Swft opinion
by his colleagues and the public. Freyer's view is closer to that of
Bridwell and Whitten. They differ, however, over the degree of co-
herence and stability that commercial law had attained at the time of
Swft. Freyer's view, that commercial law was essentially unclear,
seems more convincing.26 Insofar as Horwitz contends that Swift was
shaped to suppress the populist underclass,27 while Bridwell and
Whitten contend that the opinion was intended to honor "longstand-
ing and widely accepted principles of private international jurispru-
dence that were called general commercial law,"28 their views are
sharply antagonistic. At the same time, these opposing views seem
to share the assumption that Sw/ft can be explained by the mono-
lithic influence of one idea at the time of decision. I think Freyer's
book disproves that possibility. He is convincing in suggesting that
Swi? evolved from, and was made possible by, a climate of uncer-
tainty. And, quite apart from what Story may have desired,29 it was
21. J. G-AY, THE NATURE AND SouRcEs OF THE LAW 253 (2d ed. 1938).
22. Professor Gray's view is discussed and dismissed as "that of an amateur psychologist"
in Teton, supra note 16, at 526.
23. M. HoRwrrZ, supra note 5, at 250.
24. "Certainly, it is apparent that no desire to force a national procommercial jurispru-
dence on the states was behind the Swift decision." R. BRIDWELL & R. WHiTTEN, supra note
5, at 95.
25. Id at 90.
26. At the same time, it is difficult to excuse Freyer's failure, despite his frequent references
to Horwitz's work, pp. 1, 2, 165, 167, 170, 171, to grapple with his arguments, and Freyer's
failure to give more than superficial attention, p. 165, to Bridwell and Whitten's work.
27. Reviewing Horwitz's earlier writing on this theme, Professor Holt observed:
In noting the darker side of the intimacy between instrumentalist judges and entrepre-
neurs, he emphasizes that the law not only facilitated but cemented and protected the
enlargement of the political power of the capitalist class.
Holt, Now and Then: The Uncertain State of Nineteenth-Century American Legal History, 7
IND. L. REv. 615, 624 (1974).
28. R. BRIDWELL & R. WHrrrEN, supra note 5, at 70.
29. Freyer does not appear to question the conventional view that a unified body of com-
mercial law was hoped for under Swift, see, e.g., L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW
February 1984]
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impossible that he could have foreseen, much less orchestrated, the
effects the Swift doctrine would ultimately have. Story's nationalist
reveries never led him to suggest that federal courts had anything
approaching exclusive jurisdiction over commercial law cases.30 It
was only after postbellum changes in the scope and application of
federal diversity jurisdiction that massive inroads on the concurrent
jurisdiction of state courts became possible.3 1
As the force of Swift as a commercial precedent declined, it be-
gan to take on a new and more disturbing significance. Discussion of
"general" and "local" law in Swi left many points of law unac-
counted for and usually it was the general law category into which
new problems were placed.32 Even more troublesome was the ten-
dency of the Supreme Court to displace state law even within the
sanctuary of "local" matters originally defined in Swf. 33 The Swift
doctrine, though it never was without champions, grew increasingly
unpopular. The formalistic jurisprudence of characterization - ex-
emplified by the supposed distinction between general and local law
- was to face growing skepticism in the twentieth century.34 The
problems with Swft, however, went deeper than jurisprudential
style.
The "general law" exception to the Rules of Decision Act led to
the creation of an expanding body of general federal common law.
Corporations, an enormous new class of litigants, 35 regarded the dif-
ference between rights conferred under general federal common law
and those recognized by state courts as an advantage. 36 Throughjudicious selection of the place of incorporation (pp. 102-10), a cor-
poration was frequently able to insure that suits by or against it
would be litigated by a federal court exercising its diversity jurisdic-
231 (1973), or that Story might have gone further than his opinion in Swi/? to achieve a kind of
national law merchant if he could have taken the Court with him. P. 73; see also note 16 supra.
30. See pp. xv, 25.
31. See notes 35-37 infra and accompanying text.
32. Freyer's discussion of the phenomenon in bond and torts cases is particularly interest-
ing. Pp. 58-72.
33. The most significant example was the removal of state cases interpreting state statutes
or constitutions from the preserve of "local" law created by Swift. See note 19 supra and
accompanying text. Four of these cases, Rowan v. Runnels, 46 U.S. 134 (5 How.) (1846),
Watson v. Tarpley, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 517 (1855), Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque, 68 U.S. (I
Wall.) 175 (1863), and Burgess v. Seligman, 107 U.S. 20 (1882), are discussed both by Freyer,
pp. 48, 51, 58, 61, and Jackson, The Aie andFall ofSwft . Tyson, 24 A.B.A. J. 609, 611-13
(1938).
34. See, e.g., Morse, Characterization: Shadow or Substance, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 1027
(1949) (criticism of characterization in conflict of laws).
35. Specialized middlemen, who were the primary commercial creditors at the time of
Swift, had, by 1870, given way to corporate entities. P. 56.
36. Pp. 56, 110; see also J.W. HuRsT, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW - THE LAW
MAKERS 190 (1950); Teton, supra note 16, at 529-30.
[Vol. 82:869
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tion.37 The most famous example of this manipulative use of Swift
doctrine and federal diversity jurisdiction was in Black and White
Taxicab and Transfer Co. v. Brown and Yellow Taxicab and Transfer
Co. 38 In this federal diversity proceeding, the Supreme Court per-
mitted the plaintiff to enforce in Kentucky a contract which under
Kentucky state law was void as against public policy. Originally,
plaintiff and defendant had both been Kentucky corporations.
Plaintiff created federal diversity jurisdiction before suit by dissolv-
ing the Kentucky Corporation and reincorporating in Tennessee. It
has been suggested that the facts of Black and White Taxicab were so
blatant that it was open to the Supreme Court to refuse jurisdiction
without renouncing Swift.39 It may have been better, however, for
the case to have been decided the way it was, for the egregious facts
of the case and the "enormous criticism" (p. 105) that the decision
evoked may have had a purgative effect upon the Court. Erie was to
follow in a decade.4° Meanwhile, "the Court drew back from further
extensions of the Sw/ft doctrine" (p. 106). Finally, Black and White
Taxicab provided Justices Holmes, Brandeis and Stone an opportu-
nity to join in the last and most famous of a line of principled and
visionary dissents which were to herald the coming of Erie.
41
Though the outline of events between Swift and Erie was already
understood, Freyer contributes something by pulling information
heretofore found in scattered sources into a single narrative. How-
ever, his more interesting and original contributions at this point of
the book are his suggestions concerning how changing conceptions
of law and sources of legal authority contributed to the criticism and
eventual demise of the Sw/ft doctrine. It is at least arguable that
Swif sought to secure for federal judges no more than a view of
general principles of law unobstructed by conflicting state judicial
precedents. Freyer suggests that this conception began to seem
amorphous and, to some, disingenuous only when,
after the Civil War, the metaphysical foundation of the belief in gen-
37. In 1875, corporations were aided by congressional enlargement of the scope of general
diversity jurisdiction and removal. P. 55.
38. 276 U.S. 518 (1928)
39. C. WRIGHT, supra note 11, at 351. It is important to remember that, when Erie did
overrule Swift, it deprived corporations of their greatest gain from manipulating diversity ju-
risdiction but did not bar the manipulation itself. Finally, in 1958, Congress acted to stem
these abuses by extending the citizenship of a corporation to the additional state, if any,
"where it has its principal place of business." 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (1976). See C. WRIGHT,
supra note 11, at 129.
40. Black and Whie Taxicab was exhibit "A" in Brandeis's indictment of the Swift doc-
trine. 304 U.S. at 73.
41. See Freyer's discussions of Justice Field dissenting in Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v.
Baugh, 149 U.S. 368 (1893), pp. 69-70; Miller dissenting in Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque, 68
U.S. (I Wall) 175 (1863), pp. 59-60; and Holmes dissenting in Muhlker v. N.Y. & Harlem
R.R., 197 U.S. 544 (1905), Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U.S. 349 (1910), and Southern
Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917), pp. 102-04.
February 1984]
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eral standards back of all legal rules seems to have been eroded. Un-
dermining this belief was a growing perception that legal principles
were in fact nothing more than doctrines found in the local law of the
state, or in the national common law. . . .[Pp. 73-741.
Holmes may have said it best in his famous observation: "The com-
mon law is not a brooding omnipresence in the sky but the articulate
voice of some sovereign .... -42
What sovereign has or should have authority to create rules of
decision to govern federal diversity cases? Skirted in the Swift deci-
sion itself,43 this question had become a favorite both of those con-
demning the Swift doctrine and those defending it. The argument
that federal courts acting under Swft usurped state lawmaking au-
thority was made forcefully in Supreme Court dissents,4 by mem-
bers of academe (pp. 87-92) and in Congress (pp.78-81, 108-09). On
the other side of the debate, "the Court increasingly based its com-
mon-law authority" under the Swift doctrine "on constitutional prin-
ciple" (p. 74). Some members of academe supported the
preeminence of federal sovereignty as well (p. 118-19).
Erie v. Tompkins overruled Swifi's interpretation of the Rule of
Decision Act. Justice Brandeis stated:
Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of
Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the State. And
whether the law of the State shall be declared by its Legislature in a
statute or by its highest court in a decision is not a matter of federal
concern. There is no federal general common law.45
Freyer spends relatively little of the book focusing upon the
42. Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222, (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting),
quoted by Freyer, p. 104. Story, of course, would have regarded the common law of commer-
cial transactions as a felicitous omnipresence in the sky.
43. See note 18 supra and accompanying text.
44. See note 41 supra and accompanying text.
45. 304 U.S. at 78. Of course, Justice Brandeis did not suggest that federal courts should
entirely give up making common law. "[The same justice the same day in another case
pointed out that there may be questions of'federal common law' upon which state statutes and
decisions cannot be conclusive, such as the apportionment between two states of the water of
an interstate stream." Clark, State Law in the Federal Courts: The Brooding Omn~presence of
Erie v. Tompkins, 55 YALE L.J. 268, 273 (1946) (citing Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry
Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110 (1938)).
While Freyer clearly grasps the distinction between federal general common law and fed-
eral common law, see pp. xv, 25, he is not always careful to observe it in the book, referring to
federal general common law as "federal common law," see pp. 94, 107. Moreover, he over-
states the importance of the true federal common law which survived Erie, suggesting it has
become a centralizing force which threatens "to overturn the decentralist intent of the Erie
opinion .. " P. xv. Instances of Supreme Court creation of federal common law have been
episodic and undisciplined. See Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47
COLUM. L. REv. 527 (1947); Jackson, Full Faith and Credit - The Lawyer's Clause of the
Constitution, 45 COLUM. L. Rnv. 1 (1945). But see Friendly, supra note 13, at 408-21. In a
series of recent cases, the Supreme Court expressed reservations about adopting an expansive
view of the lawmaking power of the federal judiciary. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S.
304 (1981); Texas Industries v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630 (1981); Middlesex County
Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Assn., 453 U.S. 1 (1981).
[Vol. 82:869
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Court's decision in Erie (pp. 129-53). This may be, in part, because
virtually every aspect of Erie - for example, the true importance of
Professor Warren's research, 46 or the choice between the approaches
of Brandeis and Reed to overruling Swft47 - has been so thor-
oughly explored before. Part of the reason may also be Freyer's ap-
parent interest in winding the book up without proceeding to
questions concerning application of the Rules of Decision Act which
have plagued courts and commentators since Erie.
When I finished the book I found the chronological point at
which Freyer chose to end it premature and arbitrary. Do not con-
temporary questions about Erie's reach also set up, to use Freyer's
words, a "tension between harmony and dissonance" touching "the
very essence of American Federalism," concerning "a determination
of the limits of power of state and national government" (p. 160)?
On further reflection, and in fairness to Freyer, I think the answer is
no.
It is certainly true that in hard cases today under the Rules of
Decision Act, Erie, alone, is of little help. What does the federal
diversity judge do when the meaning of state law is unclear?48 When
state law and a federal rule of civil procedure conflict?49 When
46. In part, Brandeis based his attack on Swift on Charles Warren's research and argument
that Story had misconstrued the original purpose of the Rules of Decision Act. Warren, New
Light on the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARV. L. REv. 49, 51-52, 81-88, 108 (1923).
Brandeis's partial reliance on the article was to cast a slight shadow over Erie, since Warren's
methods and conclusions were, in time, roundly attacked. See, e.g., the critics cited at p. 178
n.21 . For a particularly lucid critique of Warren's position, see A. VON MEHIREN & D.
TRAUTMAN, THE LAW OF MULTISTATE PROBLEMS: CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONFLICT OF
LAWS 1033-34 (1965).
Freyer provides the conventional view of this episode. Pp, 111-13. His more original con-
tribution is to suggest elsewhere in the book how longstanding was the alliance of academics
and Court skeptics of Swt. Holmes had allied himself with Charles Warren in his dissent in
Black and White Taxicab. P. 105. Earlier, in Kuhn, Holmes had allied himself with John
Chipman Gray's attack of Swift. P. 103.
47. The debate concerned whether allusions to the constitutional infirmity of the Swift
doctrine, see note 13 supra, were necessary in order to overrule Swift's reading of the Rules of
Decision Act. Concurring separately, Reed thought they were not. 304 U.S, at 90-92. It has
been assumed that Brandeis could bring himself to overrule a prior settled interpretation of a
congressional enactment (and, with it, overrule hundreds, if not thousands, of general federal
common law precedents) only by entertaining the prospect of a constitutional question. See E.
LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION To LEGAL REASONING 56-57 (1948); Friendly, supra note 13, at 392.
On the use of such an argument to broaden judicial powers of statutory interpretation, see
Kurland,supra note 12, at 204. Interestingly, Freyer gives Justice Stone considerable credit for
shaping Brandeis's approach in handling Erie's constitutional law dimension. Pp. 138-39.
48. Judge Clark found problems posed "where the state law is confused or nonexistent" to
be "the most troublesome" aspect of Erie. Clark, supra note 45, at 290. Judge Clark's fear
that federal courts would be constrained by Erie, id at 290-91, has not always been realized.
The willingness of federal courts to leap into the breach is exemplified in Mason v. American
Emery Wheel Works, 241 F.2d 906 (Ist Cir. 1957) (district court not obligated to apply state
law to determine tort liability where state supreme court had indicated a willingness to revise
the prevailing rule). But there is no clear guidance available from Erie or succeeding Supreme
Court cases and the problem remains perplexing.
49. Supreme Court opinions grappling with such conflicts, e.g., Ragan v. Merchants Trans-
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choice-of-law and change-of-venue issues combine?50 But these and
other contemporary questions belong to the era begun by Erie, while
Freyer's book treats the era which Erie at long last brought to an
end: the reign of Swift v. Tyson. Henry Hart aptly described the
difference:
The Erie case left in its train many unresolved questions .... But the
questions were left to be resolved as questions only of choice between
state law and federal law. The case put a period, with an exclamation
point, to the notion that the decisional rules of the state courts had a
status inferior to state statutes in the spheres, whatever they were, in
which state law governed.51
It was not unreasonable for Freyer to place the last period in his
manuscript at about the same place. Policies of federalism may
figure in the contemporary resolution of post-Erie issues but the poli-
tics of federalism have become inaudible. Federal courts no longer
do much, if any, violence to state substantive law.52 Erie marks the
boundary line and Freyer is justified in not taking his readers across.
fer and Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949), Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965), Walker v.
Armco Steel Corporation, 446 U.S. 740 (1980), have been less than clear and not altogether
consistent. For thoughtful but distinctly different responses to the problem compare M. RED-
ISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER 169-203
(1980) (arguing for a balancing test under the Rules of Decision Act), with Ely, supra note 12
(arguing for the accommodation of cases within the Rules Enabling Act).
50. After Erie, there was a brief uncertainty whether choice-of-law rules for federal courts
sitting in diversity were still permissible or whether they were part of the general common law
Erie had invalidated. The Supreme Court determined them to be the latter in Klaxon Co. v.
Stentor Electric Mfg., 313 U.S. 487 (1941). Analytic problems have greatly taxed federal
courts in administering the Klaxon rule. Difficulties in ascertaining state law, see note 48
supra, can be particularly acute when federal judges attempt to ascertain state choice-of-law
rules. This is due in part to the inherent difficulty of choice-of-law doctrine and in part due to
inconsistency in state choice of law brought about by local bias. See Shreve, In Search ofa
Choice-of-Law Reviewing Standard-Reflections on Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague, 66 MINN.
L. REv. 327, 339 n.63 (1982).
Klaxon problems are aggravated in transfer-of-venue cases. While it is now settled that the
state choice-of-law rule of the transferor forum is generally to be applied, Van Dusen v. Bar-
rack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964), the troublesome questions remain whether Van Dusen should be
followed in transfers under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)(1976) when plaintiff's case clearly would have
been dismissed onforum non conveniens grounds if he had filed in the state court of the trans-
feror forum. To follow Van Dusen in such a case would appear to give plaintiff unfair leverage
in shopping for favorable conflicts law. Yet this was the result In re Air Crash Disaster at
Boston, Mass., 399 F. Supp. 1106 (D. Mass. 1975).
51. Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 489, 506
(1954).
52. After Justice Frankfurter's stem lecture in Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99
(1945), distinctions betwen substance and procedure are usually attempted with a certain trepi-
dation. Nonetheless, it seems clear that intrusions upon expressions of local policy reflected in
state rules of liability, intrusions represented by Swift and continuing through Black and White
Taxicab, were largely, if not completely, snuffed out by Erie.
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